St. John's Law Review
Volume 32, May 1958, Number 2

Article 5

Illusory Transfers and Section 18
Paul Powers

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview
This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's Law Scholarship
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in St. John's Law Review by an authorized editor of St. John's Law
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu.

ILLUSORY TRANSFERS AND SECTION 18
PuL, POW

st

T HE passage

of more than a quarter of a century since the
enactment of Section 1S of the Decedent Estate Law provides not only an opportunity to study its growth and decline
in the countless cases which have set its boundaries and fixed
its meaning, but, more important, it enables us to discuss its
defects from a different background of public sentiment than
that which attended its beginnings. Today, we accept without any misgiving the idea of a compulsory share for the surviving spouse, and many there are who remember a different
rule only as history. Yet when the idea was first advanced
in its legislative form, it proposed a restriction on a long
enjoyed freedom of testamentary disposition, and was greeted
with some reluctance, if not active opposition. We shall
understand better the failure of the Commissioners to deal
more resolutely with problems that were apparent from the
very beginning if we remember the climate of public opinion
in which they labored.

When we put the statute to the test of time and try to
assess the impairment caused by the assaults of the unfriendly and the neglect of the indifferent, it is quite natural
that we shall find that it has suffered its greatest damage
at the point of its most glaring weakness, namely, the lack
of adequate protection against disinheritance through gratuitous inter vivos transfers. The statute never made explicit
reference to the effect of such transfers on the right of the
surviving spouse. The courts contrived a somewhat limited
defense which they developed under the title "Illusory
Transfers." We shall take that title as the subject of this
article. Perhaps we should avoid the use of terms so vulnerable to criticism, but in the present instance they have the
t Professorial Lecturer in Law, St. John's University School of Law.
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advantage of widespread and long continued usage, and although few will pretend to be able to define an illusory transfer, all familiar with Section 18 will understand the scope
of our discussion when it is so entitled.
As far back as 1928 the Commission to Investigate
Defects in the Laws of Estates, more commonly known as
the Decedent Estate Commission, was warned of the threat
to the widow's share by gratuitous inter vivos transfers. An
article on the proposed legislation adverting to the Commission's statement that "there is a glaring inconsistency in our
law which compels a man to support his wife during his lifetime and permits him to leave her practically penniless at
his death,"'1 had this comment to offer:
If this "glaring inconsistency" is to be eliminated then we must do as
the French do, limit both the testamentary power and also the power
to make gifts inter vivos, because a man desiring.to leave his wife
penniless can accomplish this end by living trusts just as well as by
a will.2
The Decedent Estate Commissioners were familiar with that
article and its critical evaluation of their proposals,' but
there is no reference at all in any of the Commission reports
to any consideration of the idea of placing a restriction or
limitation on gratuitous transfers of property.
The Commission was, at that time, engaged in the attempt to minimize as far as possible the conflict between two
discordant policies, namely, that of enlarging and protecting
the widow's rights on the one hand, and that of assuring a
freer alienability of property on the other. So intent was the
legislature in the fulfillment of the one policy, that it explicitly declared in the statute itself that its aim and purpose
was
.. .to increase the share of a surviving spouse in the estate of a
deceased spouse, either in a case of intestacy or by an election against
LEG. Doc. No. 70, COMBINED REPORTS, COMMISSION TO INVESTIGATE
(hereinafter cited as
IN THE LAWS OF ESTATES 18 (reprinted 1935)
COMBINED REPORTS).
2 Note, Proposed Changes in the New York Law of Estates, 28 COLUm. L.
1

1928

DEFECTS

REv. 1088. 1094 (1928).
3 1928 LEG. Doc. No. 70,

COMBINED REPORTS

171.
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the terms of the will of the deceased spouse thus enlarging property
4
rights of such surviving spouse.
This unusually explicit declaration of legislative policy was
undoubtedly intended to fortify the statute in cases where
the words chosen to express that policy might prove too weak
for the burden entrusted to them. As to the other matter
of policy the Decedent Estate Commission plainly expressed
as one of its objectives "...
the removal of the restraints on
the conveyance of real estate with a view of giving realty, as
nearly as possible, the liquidity and ease of disposition now
characteristic of personal property." 5 One of the principal
restraints on alienation which was in the process of being
changed was that flowing from the widow's inchoate right
of dower. With dower abolished, 6 that restriction was removed. Under the circumstances, it is not difficult to understand the practical reasons behind the failure of the Commissioners to write into Section 18 a new restraint on the
power of one spouse freely to dispose of his real and personal
property during his lifetime. Of course, there may have been
other reasons for their failure. It may be that the Commissioners considered the idea but felt no immediate necessity
for pursuing it, for the Pennsylvania enactment on which the
New York statute was based contained at that time no restrictions on inter vivos transfers. 7 Perhaps the Commissioners were content to take one step at a time; to state
the aim and purpose of the statute in bold and clear terms
in the expectation that the legislative policy would be enforced adequately through sympathetic judicial construction." Whatever the reason for their failure to take positive
action, we begin with a statute that lacks effective provision
for preserving the "increased benefits" which it explicitly
promises to the surviving spouse.
The history of Section 18 in the courts confirms the
fears uttered at the outset and makes it clear that there are
Laws of N.Y. 1929, c. 229, § 20.
1928 LEG. Doc. No. 70, COMBINED
6Laws of N.Y. 1929, c. 229, § 12.

4

5

7
8

1928 LEG. Doc. No. 70, COMBINED

REPORTS
REPORTS

12, 149.
119, 157, 166.

See Matter of Byrnes, 141 Misc. 346, 350, 252 N.Y. Supp. 587, 591 (Sup.
Ct. 1931) (opinion of Surrogate Foley, Chairman of the Decedent Estate
Commission).
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many ways of disinheriting a wife besides merely leaving her
out of the will. It would be neither possible nor useful to
trace that history through all of the reported decisions. The
rise and fall of vitality in Section 18 will be clearly evident
if we plot its course through a few of the important appellate
court decisions. Nor would it be useful at this point in its
history to attempt a critical evaluation of these decisions.
Most of them have been discussed so widely that even mere
citation of the law reviews would consume too much space.
For our present purposes we must look at the decisions realistically, accepting them as definitive judicial interpretations
of the statute. It will become obvious that what is now
urgently needed is legislative action. However, we must not
pass over the court decisions lightly. It is necessary to
understand all that they imply, for the past always has its
effect on the future and any legislative amendment to the
present statute can itself be affected by the long shadows cast
by early decisions. The leading decisions demand, therefore,
a close examination.
Bodner v. Feit 9 was not the first decision to put the
strong arm of the court behind the legislative policy, 10 but it
was one of the first to evoke extended comment."' In that
case, the court read Section 18 with an eye to the declared
legislative intent to enlarge rather than restrict the rights
of the surviving spouse, and it expressed the view that these
enlarged rights of the spouse
...may not be destroyed by transfers under which the grantor retains the control and benefit of his property during life but which
upon death pass the property to others than those entitled to receive
it under the statute. Under the statute, husbands and wives have
the utmost freedom of control over their respective properties and
may transfer them as they will in normal course during their lives.
They may not, however, strip themselves of their property for the

9247 App. Div. 119, 286 N.Y. Supp. 814 (1st Dep't 1936).
See Rubin v. Myrub Realty Co., 244 App. Div. 541, 544, 279 N.Y. Supp.
867, 870 (1st Dep't 1935).
1See 37 COLUM. L. REv. 317 (1937); 50 HARV. L. REv. 529 (1937);
14 N.Y.U.L.Q. REv. 101 (1936); 46 YALE L.J. 884 (1937).
10
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sole purpose of depriving those that the statute intended to protect
12
of their right to inherit.
That decision never received the approval of the highest
court, and refinements that were subsequently made in the
rule to be applied in such cases somewhat limit its general
authority.
The leading case in New York is Newman v. Dore.13
Here, too, the New York Court of Appeals dealt sympathetically with Section 18 and sought to give vitality to the de4
clared legislative policy. Like Bodner v. Feit,1
it held that
rights are given to the surviving spouse under Section 18,
and such rights cannot be destroyed by transfers under which
the grantor reserves dominion, control and enjoyment of
property during his lifetime and attempts to pass it on at
his death in defiance of the statute. However, in Newman v.
Dore '1 the court did not go as far as did the court in the
earlier case. It obviously decided to tread carefully in the
new field, to go no further than the necessities of the case
before it, and to permit the governing rules to develop as
circumstances demanded. In that case the decedent's will
complied with Section 18 in form, and it professed to set
aside for the widow's benefit the minimum portion required
by that statute. However, three days before his death the
decedent executed trust agreements by which he conveyed all
of his real and personal property to named trustees. The
trust deeds reserved to him the enjoyment of the entire income of the properties as long as he should live and the right
to revoke the trusts at his will. Powers conferred upon the
trustees were in terms made subject to the settlor's control
during his life, and such powers could be exercised only in
such manner as the settlor should from time to time direct
in writing. As the court remarked, the settlor had thus reserved substantially the same rights to enjoy and control the
disposition of the property as he enjoyed prior to the making
of the trust deeds.
12

Bodner v. Feit, 247 App. Div. 119, 121-22, 286 N.Y. Supp. 814, 817 (1st

Dep't 1936).
13275 N.Y. 371, 9 N.E.2d 966 (1937).
14 Bodner

v. Feit, note 12 supra.
25 275 N.Y. 371, 9 N.E.2d 966 (1937).
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The New York Court .of Appeals rejected motive and
intent of the donor as a decisive factor in determining the
validity of the challenged conveyance. An intent to evade
or circumvent Section 18 was declared to be insufficient in
and of itself to strike down the transfer as invalid. Since
Section 18 does not prohibit gratuitous inter vivos transfers,
the only sound test of the lawfulness of the transfer, said
the court,

".

.. is

whether it is real or illusory ...

whether

the husband has in good faith divested himself of ownership
of his property or has made an illusory transfer." 16 The
good faith required of a donor or settlor was held to refer
not to his purpose in respect of the expectant rights of his
spouse, but rather to his intent to divest himself of ownership of the property. Turning to the facts in the case before
it, the court said:
Judged by the substance, not by the form, the testator's conveyance is illusory, intended only as a mask for the effective retention
by the settlor of the property which in form he had conveyed. We
do not attempt now to formulate any general test of how far a settlor
must divest himself of his interest in the trust property to render the
conveyance more than illusory. Question of whether reservation of
income or of a power of revocation, or both, might even without reservation of the power of control be sufficient to show that the transfer
was not intended in good faith to divest the settlor of his property
must await decision until such question arises. In this case it is clear
that the settlor never intended to divest himself of his property. He
was unwilling to do so even when death was near.17
This decision reveals a sympathetic consideration of the
rights given by Section 18 to the surviving spouse and an
effort to protect and preserve those rights against what was
palpably a scheme to frustrate them. It tells us that it did
not intend to formulate a general rule applicable to all cases,
but necessarily, it had to make some choice among the tests
by which such transactions are to be judged. It might have
measured such donations of property with an eye to the statute, to the policy which it declared and to the mischief it
meant to cure, and fitted the standard to those specifications.
16 Id. at 379, 9 N.E.2d at 969.
17 Id. at 381, 9 N.E.2d at 969-70.

1958] SURVIVING SPOUSE'S RIGHT OF ELECTION 199
It chose instead the so called real-or-illusory test. Time and
events have not blessed that choice.
Moreover, in formulating that test, it is particularly unfortunate that the court chose the word illusory. The term
is not so narrow in its scope as to carry the same meaning
to all.' 8 Newman v. Dore cited as authority for the real-orillusory test the case of Leonard v. Leonard 19 decided by
Justice Holmes, then Chief Justice of the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts. The cited case involved at least
three separate transfers, but the term illusory was not employed in respect to the one which engaged most of the attention of the Court of Appeals and which evoked the rulings
which it quoted with approval. ° A purported transfer of a
bank account occasioned little comment, and it was in respect to that transaction that Mr. Justice Holmes observed
that the evidence may have established "1... that this transfer

was only illusory and was not understood to be effectual between the parties." 21 Both decisions used the same word to
convey the idea of an outward appearance which failed to
give the true character of what was perceived. But one was
referring to an apparent transfer which was never intended
between the parties to be any transfer at all; the other was
characterizing a conveyance which was seriously intended
by the parties to take effect in strict accord with its terms,
but was not meant to destroy the donor's enjoyment of, or
control over, the property. The very terms of the transfernot a secret agreement-preserved that control. The pretended transfer which is pure sham and the device which
is intended to circumvent the statute by a transfer which is
very seriously intended, have much in common, but they have
28 2 Scorr, TRUSTS 1021 (2d ed. 1956) ; Niles, Trusts and Administration,
19.52 Survey of American Law, 28 N.Y.U.L. REv. 633 (1953).
19 181 Mass. 458, 63 N.E. 1068 (1902).
20 That part of the opinion in Leonard v. Leonard, 181 Mass. 458, 63 N.E.
1068 (1902), which was quoted with approval in Newman v. Dore, explained
the earlier decision of the Massachusetts court in Brownell v. Briggs, 173
Mass. 529, 54 N.E. 251 (1899). The Brozmell case itself was later overruled
in Kerwin v. Donaghy, 317 Mass. 559, 59 N.E.2d 299 (1945), wherein it was
said that the limitation in some of the cases that a gift must not be "colorable"
means only that the conveyance or gift ". .. must- be one legally binding on
the settlor or donor, accomplishes in his lifetime, and not testamentary in its

effect." Id. at 571-72, 59 N.E.2d at 307.
21

Leonard v. Leonard, supra note 20, at 1070.
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very distinct differences. Regrettably, the common label,
which their similarities permit both to use, has obscured the
differences and destroyed any usefulness the test may have
had in the beginning.2 2
The Court of Appeals assumed in Newman v. Dore that
except for the provisions of Section 18, the instrument of
transfer would be valid and would operate according to its
terms. The New York decisions fully and completely support that assumption. The Court of Appeals had said:
. . . [F]ew things are better settled than that the reservation of
[a power of revocation] is entirely consistent with the trust, and does
not work3 its destruction where the rights of creditors are not
involved.2
The reservation of certain administrative control in a trust
does not invalidate the trust.2

4

Nor does the reservation of

income to the donor cause the trust to fail. None of these
cases, of course, involved the rights of a surviving spouse.
In each case, the question was whether the transaction resulted in a valid trust or no trust at all. Neither singly nor
in the aggregate do these factors infect with invalidity a
transfer in trust.
Nothing but confusion is added to the discussion when
we attempt to judge an invasion of the spouse's rights under
Section 18 by tailoring general principles of trust law to fit
the demands of justice in the circumstances. The line between a good trust and a mere agency may sometimes be difficult to trace clearly.23 5 However, when all the elements of a
valid trust are present and the real question is whether it
would violate some established policy of the State, we cannot
judge the violation of the public policy when we use only
principles that were made for a wholly different use. The
22 Coinpare the definition of the word "colorable" in 40 GEo. L.J. 109, 113
(1951), with 44 MIcH. L. Rav. 151, 153 (1945). See also meaning of the word
"illusory" in Matter of Shupack, 1 N.Y.2d 482, 488, 136 N.E.2d 513, 516 (1956).
23 Von Hesse v. MacKaye, 136 N.Y. 114, 119, 32 N.E. 615, 616 (1892).
24 See, e.g., Van Cott v. Prentice, 104 N.Y. 45, 54-55, 10 N.E. 257, 261
(1887); Pinckney v. City Bank Farmers Trust Co., 249 App. Div. 375, 292
N.Y. Supp. 835 (3d Dep't 1937); City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. Charity
Organization Soc'y, 238 App. Div. 720, 265 N.Y. Supp. 267 (1st Dep't 1933),
aff'd met., 264 N.Y. 441, 19 N.E.2d 504 (1934).
25 See Scott, Trusts and the Statute of Wills, 43 HARV. L. REV. 521 (1930).
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only issue in such a situation is whether a trust instrument
is invalid for failure to comply with the public policy declared by the Statute of Wills, or that explicitly written in
Section 18 26 or that defined in some other statute. The solution of the issue must depend upon the particular statute
involved, its purpose, the policy behind it, and the results
which it is designed to prevent. To say that a trust instrument would be valid except for Section 18 means that its
validity must be tested by that section and not by some convenient principles somewhat altered for the new use to which
they are put.
One further note must be made of the effect of the decision in Newmn v. Dore. If the transfer is assumed to be
perfectly good and effective except for Section 18, one might
expect the courts to uphold it except to the extent that it
constitues an unlawful invasion of the rights conferred by
that statute. However, when it was found in iVewman v.
Dore that the conveyance took back almost all that it gave,
the Court of Appeals struck down the entire instrument.
The decree declared that the trust deeds were void and of no
effect, directed the trustees to transfer all of the assets held
by them to the personal representatives of the settlor, and
extinguished all right, title and interest of the plaintiff and
others in and to the proceeds of the trust fund.2 7 The Court
of Appeals deemed itself compelled to -view the single conveyance as entirely real or wholly illusory, for it was reluctant to call a single conveyance real as to some distributees
and an illusory transfer as to others. No such considerations
would have affected the decretal provisions had the court
framed the rule of law with reference to the statute which
alone stood in the way of the instrument's complete validity.
It might then have said that the conveyance was void only to
the extent that it infringed upon the rights conferred by the
statute.

26 1 Scowt, TRUSTS 451, 470-71 (2d ed. 1956); RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS § 57
(1935).
27 Transcript of Record, pp. 64-66, 190-96, Newman v. Dore, 275 N.Y. 371,

9 N.E.2d 966 (1937).
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Burns v. Turnbull 21 involved a deed of trust which reserved such a degree of control over the property that the
judgment setting it aside and declaring it illusory did not
call for any written opinion by the Court of Appeals and
only a brief memorandum by the Appellate Division. The
significance of this case is in what appears to be its recognition of the rights of the surviving spouse where the decedent left no will at all. The wife died intestate, and the
husband brought the action both individually and as administrator of her estate. The judgment required the respondents to deliver to the plaintiff all of the property included
in the alleged trust. Enforcement of the legislative policy
clearly requires protection of the spouse's minimum share in
cases of intestacy. In so many of the cases, the will mocks
the widow by a bequest which in words gives her more than
her minimum share, but which relates to an estate that has
already been plucked bare of its fruit. Here the court recognized the necessity of protecting the spouse's intestate
share, and it lent its aid to the enforcement of the declared
legislative policy.
In Marine Midland Trust Co. v. Standford,2 9 the husband created a trust with plaintiff as trustee. He retained
the power to amend, modify, alter or revoke the trust in
whole or in part. The instrument gave him the right to request payments out of corpus up to a specified amount and
a veto over any sale or disposition of the investments held
in the trust. Upon his death, the principal was payable to
his children, subject to a small legacy to a church. A most
significant fact is that within a year or two prior to executing the trust deed; the husband had made a settlement with
his wife as a result of which she received more than half of
his entire property. The opinion makes it clear that the
court was influenced by the fact that an equitable settlement
had been made with the wife and that the transfer in trust
far from depriving her of her fair share of his estate, repre28 266 App. Div. 779, 41 N.Y.S.2d 448 (2d Dep't 1943), aff'd inem., 294
N.Y. 889, 62 N.E.2d 785 (1945).
29256 App. Div. 26, 9 N.Y.S.2d 648 (3d Dep't), aff'd, 281 N.Y. 760, 24
N.E.2d 20 (1939).
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sented rather an attempt to make an equitable adjustment
of the just claims of both wife and children on his bounty.
Thus, the motive and intent of the husband became in
truth an important factor, although Newman v. Dore had
explicitly rejected it as a touchstone. In such circumstances,
the court could not predicate its decision wholly upon a finding of the good faith and high motives of the husband. It
turned to the real-or-illusory test and it phrased that test
in this way:
The determining factor as to the validity of the trust is the
intent with which the settlor transferred his property to the trustee.
If illusory, there is no transfer; if made with intent to transfer the
actual title, it is effective. 80

The result reached was patently a just one. The means at
hand for reaching that particular result were not very well
adapted. In struggling to fit the decision within the mould,
the strain was too great. As a consequence, the shape of the
mould was somewhat altered. The intent to transfer the
actual title-an intent never lacking in any of these attempts
to defeat the surviving spouse-emerges now as the test. The
word illusory begins to change its shade of meaning again.
The somewhat changed standard was accepted and applied in Matter of Ford,31 where the wife was the principal
beneficiary under the deed of trust, and the attack upon its
validity came from collateral relatives. Section 18 of the
Decedent Estate Law was in no way involved in that litigation. Indeed the majority opinion pointed out the lack
of any intention of "defeating the expectant interest of
anyone." 32 The real question in this case would seem to be
whether the failure to comply with the Statute of Wills ren.dered the instrument invalid or ineffective. That question
is very different and distinct from the question whether a
trust instrument violates the word and the spirit of Section 18. In this case, however, the court ignored any such
distinction and treated the matters as if they were one and
so Id. at 28, 9 N.Y.S.2d at 651 (emphasis added).
31279 App. Div. 152, 108 N.Y.S.2d 122 (1st Dep't 1951), aff'd mem., 304
N.Y. 598, 107 N.E2d 87 (1952).
32 Id. at 157, 108 N.Y.S.2d at 127.
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It called once again on the real-or-illusory test.

The court decided that the

"...

trust created was not color-

able or illusory-it was a real, present and actual transfer
of ownership of all of the settlor's property to the trustee,
and was valid in all respects." 33
The degree of control reserved by the grantor in this case
is worthy of note. The trust embraced virtually all of the
settlor's property, and the settlor himself and a bank were
co-trustees. He reserved the income for his life and the power
to revoke the trust. It appears to have been the practice of
the bank, when acting as co-trustee, to make no investment
changes unless approved by the individual co-trustee. As
the minority opinion so clearly pointed out, the fact that no
action could be taken without the concurrence of the settlor,
in combination with his reserved power to amend and to revoke the trust, gave him a practical control of the entire
trust administration. If this case had been one under Section 18 where the widow had been deprived of her expectant
rights by a transfer such as this, the result may well have
been different. However, the basis for distinguishing this
case from one which directly involves Section 18 has been
somewhat weakened by the later decision in MacGregor v.
FoW.3

4

The latter case did involve Section 18 and it revealed

a very real invasion of the surviving husband's expectant
interest. The court explained its refusal to strike down the
transfer in the Ford case by pointing out that in the earlier
case

". .

. there was no attempt to defeat the right of the

surviving spouse, nor did the settlor have such control over
the trust corpus as to make the trustee bank a mere agent." 3'
Thus, the court again failed to draw the line between a violation of the Statute of Wills and a violation of Section 18,
and it confirmed the application of the same rule in both
cases even though the legislative purpose in one was far different from its objective in the other. More important, it
reiterated the opinion that a reservation of control such as
existed in the Ford case-a very effective method of control157, 108 N.Y.S.2d at 126.
34280 App. Div. 435, 114 N.Y.S.2d 286 (1st Dep't 1952), aff'd uere., 305
N.Y. 576, 111 N.E.2d 445 (1953).
33 Id. at

35 Id. at 437, 114 N.Y.S.2d at 287.
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will not endanger a transfer that is challenged under
Section 18.
Thus far we have confined our examination of the decisions to those involving deeds of trust. There are other
areas, however, where the statute has proved to be even more
vulnerable to attack. One such area is that of the joint savings bank account. In Inda v. Inda,36 the widow sued, individually and as administratrix, to recover, on behalf of
the estate, two savings bank accounts that had been in the
name of the decedent and another, payable to either or to
the survivor. One account was in the name of a son of the
decedent, who was one of his ten children, and the other was
in the name of that son's wife. The widow challenged the
deposits as illusory transfers which were ineffective to deprive her of her expectant estate as widow and distributee.
The trial court found that the decedent never intended to
divest himself of the ownership of these deposits during his
lifetime, and that they were illusory transfers, without substance or reality. It held, however, that because of the terms
of Section 239 of the Banking Law plaintiff could not recover.
The court did allow recovery against a commercial bank, and
that part of the judgment was not appealed. Subdivision
three of Section 239 of the Banking Law governs the repayment by savings banks of deposits "1... made by any person

in the names of such depositor and another person and in
form to be paid to either or the survivor of them." Such a
deposit becomes the property of such persons as joint tenants, and may be paid to either during the lifetime of both
or to the survivor, and the release of one to whom such payment is made is a valid discharge of the bank. The statute
declares that:
The making of the deposit in such form shall, in the absence of fraud
or undue influence, be conclusive evidence in any action or proceeding to which either the savings bank or the surviving depositor is a
party, of the intention of both depositors to37vest title to such deposit
and the additions thereto in such survivor.
-16288 N.Y. 315, 43 N.E.2d 59 (1942).
37 N.Y. BANKING LAw §239(3) (emphasis added).
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Subdivision three of Section 134 of the Banking Law, relating to repayment of joint deposits in commercial banks
and trust companies, does not contain this conclusive
presumption.
The Court of Appeals, in affirming the judgment, gave
careful consideration to the provisions of the Banking Law.
The Decedent Estate Law received but scant attention.
Indeed the court raised some doubt as to whether a surviving spouse possessed rights in intestacy comparable to those
given by Section 18. Solely for the purpose of the controversy then before it, it assumed that she did have such rights.
The court viewed the Banking Law as expressly preserving
this form of deposit as a lawful and convenient method for
the transmission of property. It made no effort to balance
that legislative policy against the one which gave birth to
Section 18. The finding of the trial judge that the decedent
intended in fact to make an illusory transfer was not disturbed; it was held to be immaterial. The court said:
The legal effect of a full compliance with the terms of [Section 239(3)
of the Banking Law] is the creation of joint tenancy. Therefore, as
the actual intent of the intespointed out in Newman v. Dore ....
tate makes no difference since all that the law requires by way of
38
the creation of a joint tenancy has taken place.
No line was drawn between transfers of substance and transfers of form; no effort was made to measure the transaction
by the real-or-illusory test; no attempt was made to liar
monize the different legislative policies. The Court of
Appeals apparently did not intend to depart from the holding in Yewman v. Dore. It would seem, however, that the
decision really finds more support in Marine Midland Trust
Co. v. Stanford, where the intent to transfer actual title was
held to be a factor which made the transfer unassailable even
under Section 18.39 To create a joint tenancy, full compliance with the provisions of the Banking Law is all that is
required.
A distinction had been drawn by the trial court between
a joint account in a savings bank and one in a commercial
38
39

Inda v. Inda, 288 N.Y. 315, 318, 43 N.E.2d 59, 61 (1942).
See text at note 30 supra.
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bank. The only difference between the two is that in the
former the presumption arising from the form of the account
is conclusive; in the latter it is rebuttable. The Court of
Appeals noted the entry of the judgment in respect of the
commercial account and the lack of any appeal, but it gave
no hint of its own views on that question. The reasoning of
the decision, however, would seem to make it clear that if the
depositors had intended to create a joint tenancy as permitted by statute, their intent to defeat the rights of the
spouse would not impair the transfer. It would, therefore,
make little practical difference to the surviving spouse
whether the presumption created by the form of the account
was conclusive or rebuttable. Her path would be just as difficult in either event. To overcome the presumption arising
out of the form of the account, she must establish that her
spouse did not in fact intend to create a joint tenancy, but
inasmuch as the husband had to leave the property to someone on his death, his very intent to defraud his wife tends
to strengthen the presumption. Thus, the joint bank account
seems to provide a safe and certain way of cutting off the
expectant interests of the surviving spouse.
It has come to pass, however, that an even easier and
safer method of accomplishing the same result is at hand,
namely, the so-called Totten Trust. The joint bank account
gives to the other depositor rights that may be exercised during the lifetime of the original owner. The Totten Trust
enables the depositor to preserve a dominion, control and use
of the account to an extent that would brand it illusory in
any other transaction.
At first, it seemed that the courts would not countenance
that kind of invasion of the spouse's expectancy. Debold v.
Kinscher 40 was an action by the surviving husband to set
aside transfers of bank accounts to the individual defendants
upon the ground that the transfers were illusory and violative of his rights under Section 18. One of the bank accounts
bad originally stood in the name of the wife in trust for the
husband. The wife changed the account to substitute one
40268 App. Div. 786, 48 N.Y.S2d 900 (2d Dep't 1944), aff'd ine., 294
N.Y. 668, 60 N.E.2d 758 (1945).
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of the defendants as beneficiary instead of her husband. Some
five years later she opened a new account in her name in trust
for another defendant, and a few days later she made a will
explicitly disinheriting her husband. The trial court determined that the husband had no right to the accounts. The
Appellate Division affirmed all the findings of fact, but it
reversed the judgment. Its opinion was as brief as the facts
demanded. "The testimony on behalf of the alleged donees
failed to establish a gift inter vivos. Plaintiff is entitled to
judgment." 41 It cited Newman v. Dore and Bodner v. Feit
as authority for the reversal. The Court of Appeals affirmed
without opinion. Curiously enough, the memorandum of the
State Reporter prefacing the Court of Appeals decision,
elaborated on the Appellate Division opinion to the extent
of quoting as follows from Bodner 'v. Feit in respect of the
rights given by Section 18 to the surviving spouse:
They may not be destroyed by transfers under whichi the grantor retains the control and benefit of his property during life but which
upon death pass the property to others than those entitled to receive
it under the statute. 42
These appellate decisions and the Reporter's memorandum
all seem eminently correct and in accordance with binding
authority.
The Court of Appeals also reached the same result in
Krause 'v. Krause.43 The action was by the surviving spouse
to set aside three transfers made by the decedent to his children by an earlier marriage. Two of the transfers involved
parcels of realty. In each case, the decedent conveyed a
parcel by warranty deed which reserved to the grantor the
rents and profits of the property during his life. The third
item was a bank account in the name of the decedent in trust
for his daughter. The trial court decided in favor of the
plaintiff on all the transfers, but the Appellate Division reversed and dismissed the complaint. The Court of Appeals
agreed with the Appellate Division as to the realty. It said:
41 Debold v. Kinscher, 268 App. Div. 786, 48 N.Y.S.2d 900, 901 (2d Dep't
1944), aff'd mern., 294 N.Y. 668, 60 N.E.2d 758 (1945).
42 Id. at 669, 60 N.E.2d at 758.
43 285 N.Y. 27, 32 N.E.2d 779 (1941).
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The transaction evidenced by either of these deeds was a real
transaction in that thereby [the husband] divested himself of a major
legal estate or interest in real property in accordance with the essential forms of law ....
We cannot find in section 18 of the Decedent
Estate Law any suggestion that such a conveyance by a husband or
wife was ever to be defeated by the other spouse merely on the score
44
of its having been voluntary.
As to the Totten Trust, however, the Court of Appeals found
that
the sole evidence of the aim of the account is the form of the deposit.
In these circumstances, we are to draw the inference "that the depositor intended to create a trust but intended to reserve power during
his lifetime to deal with the deposit in any way he should choose." 45
The court observed that there was no basis in the record for
a finding that a gift inter vivos had been consummated.
Without any further discussion it held that ". . . the trial
court was right on this branch of the case and that its finding
should be reinstated," 46 citing Newman r. Dore.
Whatever principle these decisions might appear to have
stood for, in and of themselves, was completely negated in
Matter of Halpern.47 In that case the surviving spouse was
the executrix under the will and its only beneficiary. Her
benefit under the will was more apparent than real because
the estate had been largely denuded by the establishment of
four Totten Trust accounts, each in the name of the decedent
in trust for his infant grandchild. The decedent had actually turned over one of the bank books to the mother of the
infant but he retained possession of the other three. The
Court of Appeals did not, however, draw any distinction between the one where delivery had been made and the ones
where full control was retained. The court was united in the
result reached but divided in the reasons for the decision.
In the majority opinion, there is again evident the
changed color of the words real and illusory. We have noted
that in Newman v. Dore the transfer was branded as illusory
4Krause v. Krause, 285 N.Y. 27, 32, 32 N.E.2d 779, 780 (1941).
45 Id. at 33, 32 N.E.2d at 781.

46 IBd.
47 303 N.Y. 33, 100 N.E.2d 120 (1951).
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even though the donor had actually intended the instrument
to take full effect in accordance with its terms. It was illusory because what the instrument reserved was too much to
permit its defeat of rights granted by Sections IS and 83.
In Matter of Halpern,the question discussed in the majority
opinion is merely whether the donor intended the instrument
of transfer to take effect in accordance with its terms. In
the Newman case, the intent to transfer title was admitted
but the issue was whether, in view of what was reserved, the
transfer was more form than substance. In the Halpcrn case,
what was reserved was held immaterial as long as the intent
to transfer title was present. Thus the majority ruled in
Matter of Halpern that "Totten Trusts, if real and not merely
colorable or pretended, are valid transfers with legally fixed
effects." 48 But by the word "colorable" it meant a mere
sham that was intended to be no transfer at all. Despite the
statement in Krause v. Krause that "the sole evidence of the
aim of the account is the form of the deposit," 40 the Court
of Appeals distinguished the ruling therein made on the
ground that:
. . [O]n the unusual facts there established, the weight of evidence
favored the holding of the trial court that decedent Krause had never
intended that his Totten trust, made in favor of his daughter who
lived in a foreign country and from whom he had not heard in years,
should have any real effect, or that the money should ever go to the
faraway daughter.5"
*

As one reads the opinion, a question so strongly suggests
itself that the opinion both recognized and gave expression
to it. Said the court: "Perhaps it may seem that we are
putting the legislative policy of section IS to rout by use of
the court made (but legislatively recognized, see Banking Law, § 239, subd. 2) rule of the Totten case." 51 Its
answer to its own inquiry was not categorical. The plain
implication was that the court left it to the legislature
48

Id. at 37, 100 N.E.2d at 122.

49 Krausb v. Krause, 285 N.Y. 27, 32, 32 N.E.2d 779, 780 (1941).
50 Matter of Halpern, 303 N.Y. 33, 38, 100 N.E.2d 120, 122 (1951).

511Id. at 39, 100 N.E.2d at 122.
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to

"...

interfere with the impact of Totten Trusts in this

connection .

.,, 52

If the reasoning of Matter of HTalpern is to be applied
to an ordinary deed of trust, the decision in Newman v. Dore
must be confined to its own facts, as was the decision in
Krause v. Krause. The question in that event must be: Has
everything required by law for the creation of a trust been
accomplished? If so, the settled legal result must follow as
a matter of course. All that will defeat the trust is the existence of an actual intent to have no trust at all, an intent
to pretend a transfer which is never to take effect at all.
As stated in the beginning, we are not engaged in a
critical review of the decisions but a realistic acceptance of
them. New York began with an effort on the part of the
courts to give strength and support to the legislative policy
and the spirit of the statute. The effort became more feeble
as time moved on. Today we must admit that the legislative
policy has been put to almost complete rout. A husband who
Nwishes to maintain complete use of, and dominion and control over, his money during his lifetime and to transmit it
at death to others than his wife, may use a joint bank account or Totten Trust. He can broadcast far and wide his
intent and his purpose to defeat his wife's rights under Section 18. Nothing will foil his plans unless he also intends
to cheat the named beneficiaries as well. The creation of a
living trust may pose some troublesome questions to his
attorney. His counsel may be in doubt as to whether the
Court of Appeals took back in Matter of HaIpera all that it
gave to Section 18 in Newman v. Dore. He may wonder, too.
whether the kind of trust held to be real in Matter of Ford
would stand up in a lawsuit in which Section 18 was actually
involved. If it can be taken at its face value and on the faith
of the later decision which explained it, there is then available to him the deed of trust which reserves income to the
donor, gives him the power to modify or revoke and appoints
the donor and a corporate fiduciary as co-trustees, thus enabling the donor to keep his property and give it away at the
same time. Even if his counsel lacks confidence that such a
2

5

Id. at 39, 100 N.E.2d at 123.
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scheme will ultimately stand up, he will have no doubt at all
of the effectiveness of a trust deed that will retain all the
fruits of the property as well as the power to modify and
revoke the instrument. Efforts to retain administrative control of the trust fund must be confined to control in a practical sense and not in any legal sense, for the latter attempt
could very well prove fatal, as it did once before. The ingenuity of draftsmen will discover paths to a satisfactory
practical control of the fund.
It thus stands clearly revealed that the rule formulated
by the courts has proved hopelessly unsatisfactory and may
be said to be now almost completely ineffective. Professor
Atkinson aptly sums up the New York decisions as follows:
"There is a single bright possibility-New York may be leading of necessity to an early complete legislative readjustment
of the property rights of the surviving spouses."

53

It is

patent that there must either be a legislative re-examination
of the statute or the inaction of the legislature will be interpreted as approval of the continued whittling down of the
rights promised to the surviving spouse.
In other jurisdictions steps have been taken to remedy
the defect which has been revealed in the election statutes.
Pennsylvania, whose statute was the source of our own Section 18, has amended its law to provide that a conveyance
by one who retains a testamentary power of appointment or
a power of revocation or a power of consumption over the
principal shall, at the election of the surviving spouse, be
treated as a testamentary disposition to the extent to which
the power has been reserved and in so far as the surviving
spouse is concerned. The rights of the spouse are made expressly subject to the rights of any income beneficiary whose
interests in income become vested in enjoyment prior to the
death of the conveyor.4 In this remedy to the problem, it is
the disposition at the moment of death that is made subject
to attack. Rights which theretofore were vested in enjoyment are immune from challenge. A gift of property with
53 Atkinson, 1949-1950 Survey of the New York Law of Succession, 25

N.Y.U.L.Q. REv. 1174, 1184 (1950).
54 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 301.11 (1956).
n.6 (2d ed. 1956).

See also 1 ScoTT, TRUsars 471
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no strings attached-no powers reserved-is likewise unassailable even though it takes effect in enjoyment at the
moment of death and even though the donor had enjoyed the
income up to that moment.
The Model Probate Code approaches the problem from
the standpoint of fraud as to the rights of the survivor. Any
gift made by a person
. whether dying testate or intestate, in fraud of the marital rights
of his surviving spouse to share in his estate, shall, at the election
of the surviving spouse, be treated as a testamentary disposition and
may be recovered from the donee and persons taking from him without adequate consideration and applied to the payment of the spouse's
share, as in case of his election to take against the will. 5
* .

A gift made by a married person within two years of his death
is deemed to be fraudulent unless shown to the contrary.5 6
The proposed statute does not attempt to define the expression "in fraud of the marital rights," and that failure is
deliberate. The comment to the text expresses the belief that
only by judicial decision can the definition be worked out.
The comment quite correctly views the "fraud of marital
rights" approach as more satisfactory than the "illusory
transfer" test.Y One other advantage of the Code proposal
is that it purports to subject to the spouse's attack a greater
area than does the Pennsylvania statute. Trusts that would
be unassailable under the latter rule would be subject to the
spouse's claim under the Code rule.
That method of solving the problem, however, has its
disadvantages as well.5 8 Too much is left to the courts in
the development of the definition of fraud, and on past history in New York, the courts may very well pass that burden
back to the legislature. In giving the spouse the right to
recover from purchasers who take from the donee "without
adequate consideration," 59 some fear has been expressed lest
it bring back all the disadvantages of inchoate dower,
broadened now to embrace personal as well as real property.
§ 33(a) (1946).
5 d. §33(b).
57Id. § 33, comment.
58 See Note, Model Probate Code, 45 MIcH. L. Rzv. 321 (1947).
i9 MODEL PROBATE CODE § 33(a) (1946) (emphasis added).
556 MODEL PROBATE CODE
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It is true that the charge of too great a restraint on alienation could not be levelled against a right of recovery from
the donee directly or from the trustee who holds for his benefit so long as only gratuitous transfers are involved.6 0 But
the word "gift" or "gratuitous transfer" must be defined in
the statute because, if the mere presence of some consideration will take the transaction beyond the statutory protection, the surviving spouse will be at a serious disadvantage.
It has been well said that "1... it would be a rare case where
some consideration could not be worked into the arrangement" 61 by skillful counsel.
An approach that held something in common with both
the Model Code and the Pennsylvania Act was proposed in
INorth Carolina. 2 Any gratuitous transfer of property would
be deemed to be in fraud of a wife unless she assented thereto,
if either the husband retained the power of revocation or the
transfer was made in contemplation of death and took place
within a year prior to his death. A gratuitous transfer was
presumed to be in contemplation of death if made within the
preceding year, but that presumption would be a rebuttable
one. Thus the reservation of the power of revocation in and
of itself would subject the transfer to the widow's claim.
However, the definition of fraud would be otherwise limited
to a gift made in contemplation of death and made within
the last year of the testator's life. Although the failure to
define fraud may open too broad a field of litigation, the limitation of the term in this proposal would seem to narrow
it too severely.
A bill 63 introduced in the New York Legislature in 1957
attempted to recover much that has been lost to the statute
since Newman v. Dore. Unfortunately, the bill sought to
perpetuate the use of the terms illusory transfer and real
transfer, unmindful that in them lay the germ of much of
60 Note, Family Relatios-Inter Vivos Transfers-Protectionof Spouse's
Statutory Share, 5 U. CHI. L. REv. 504 (1938).
61 Matter of Erstein, 205 Misc. 924, 932, 129 N.Y.S.2d 316, 324 (Surr. Ct.
1954).
62 REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE REVISION OF THE LAWS OF NORTH

34-37 (1936); Note, 46 YALE L.J. 884, 887
(1937).
63 A. Int. No. 3221, Pr. No. 3356 (Introduced by Mr. Kappelman February
19, 1957) (failed to be reported out of the Judiciary Committee).
CAROLINA RELATING TO ESTATES

1958 ] SURVIVING SPOUSE'S RIGHT OF ELECTION 215
the confusion and difficulty. The proposed new Section 83-a
of the Decedent Estate Law would declare that the rights
granted to a spouse by Sections 18 or 83
shall not be impaired or defeated by a transfer or conveyance of
property made by the decedent in his lifetime to a person other than
his surviving spouse, which transfer was made without full consideration in money or money's worth and was not intended to take
effect in possession or enjoyment until his death .... 64
...

It would specify as transfers which shall not defeat the rights
of the spouse, deposits made in banks under subdivisions two
or three of Section 134 or under the parallel subdivisions of
Section 239 of the Banking Law (which cover joint accounts
and Totten Trusts in commercial banks and in savings
banks), or investments in United States savings bonds or defense bonds payable upon the death of the purchaser to another than his spouse. The reservation by the decedent
.. . of any interest in or right of control or possession of
the property transferred or conveyed, or of the income
thereof, or of any such deposit or bond not terminable until
the death of the decedent" 65 shall be presumptive evidence
that the transaction was not intended to take effect until
death and that it was intended to defeat or impair the rights
granted by statute to the surviving spouse, ". . . and any
such transfer or conveyance, deposit or purchase shall be
deemed an illusory and not an absolute transfer." 61 The
surviving spouse may show the court that the transfer was
illusory and was made with intent to defeat or impair the
rights granted by Section 18 or Section 83 to the surviving
spouse, and if that be established to the satisfaction of
the court, it shall determine that the property belongs to
the estate and shall direct that it be paid to the legal
representative.
One grave danger in setting forth a list of proscribed
transfers is that the failure to include other similar transactions may be deemed to validate them. Hence deposits in
64 Ibid.

65 Ibid.
66 Ibid.
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industrial banks, 67 in savings and loan associations,6 8 or in
credit unions 69 are not covered by the proposed act, and may
be regarded as still open to those seeking to evade the statute
The adoption of the illusory transfer doctrine may logically require that the transaction be treated as entirely valid
or entirely void. If the illusory transfer idea were dropped
completely, that method of dealing with the property would
have nothing to recommend it. The transfer or conveyance
could be suspended only insofar as it violated the spouse's
rights; otherwise it would be allowed to stand.
All of these different attempts to furnish protection to
the rights of the surviving spouse have their merits and their
weaknesses. Considerations of time and space forbid us to
explore these proposals adequately or to discuss in detail
the advantages and disadvantages in the different methods
of approach. They deserve more attention than we have been
able to give to them, and they provide a field worthy of legislative attention and exploration.
We have thus far spoken of the rights of the surviving
spouse and the failure of the statute adequately to protect
them. We must look, too, at the rights of the other estate
beneficiaries. The New York statute does not define the elective share, although it does place a limitation upon it. The
result is to give to the surviving spouse, within the specified
limitations, the amount that he or she would have taken if
the other spouse had died intestate. In an intestate estate,
inter vivos gifts to the surviving spouse are not taken into
account at all. The same is true in determining the right to
elect and the elective share under Section 18.70 A widow
who is the beneficiary of a number of large life insurance policies may still elect to take her share in a relatively small
estate. A spouse who is the beneficiary of a very substantial
living trust ought not be permitted to challenge a relatively
small transfer to her in-laws. If fraud of her rights be the
basis of her complaint, she could hardly succeed in defeating
such a transfer. But under different statutory plans, it would
67 N.Y. BANKING LAW

68 Id. §394 (1) (5).

§ 310(5) (6).

69 Id. § 453-a.
0

In re Rosenfield's Estate, 76 N.Y.S.2d 177, 180 (Surr. Ct. 1944).
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be possible for the surviving spouse to acquire more than justice should permit.
It is clear, therefore, that mere piecemeal amendment
of Section 18 is not the solution. The entire statute should
be taken under legislative study. Only then can there be
reasonable assurance that the correction of one defect will
not create others equally serious. To repair the weaknesses
in the statute may be a task that is long and difficult. The
beginning of it can hardly be postponed any longer. What
the statute professed to give must be somehow strengthened
or there will be nothing left but the shell.

